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The most important theme to emerge in the last decade of 
evaluation and research centered on employment and train 
ing programs is that the nuts and bolts of delivery 
mechanisms can be as important as program design in deter 
mining the ultimate usefulness of labor market interven 
tions. To be credible, an analysis of training programs needs 
to examine what happens as well as why and how it happens. 
This point has been driven home again in evaluations of 
labor market programs operated by local prime sponsors 
under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(GETA). The variations in outcomes between different train 
ing strategies that labor economics has taught us to expect 
have been swamped by variations in management styles and 
a host of environmental factors.
This evaluation of CETA training in the Baltimore 
Metropolitan Area Manpower Consortium attempts to 
analyze the context in which training is done and the rela 
tionship between that and the quality of training.
The Baltimore Metropolitan Area Manpower Consortium 
is almost legendary in the short history of CETA. It has a 
reputation for competence, effectiveness, and innovation. 
On closer inspection, this author finds some blemishes, but is 
convinced that the federal employment and training system 
has a showcase in Baltimore that offers some valuable
147
148
lessons for other GET A prime sponsors. Accordingly, this 
report does not consider details of every aspect of the prime 
sponsor's training operations. The scope of the description 
and analysis was narrowed where it was logical and did not 
jeopardize the important themes.
The report focuses on "adult" training, which is to be 
distinguished from training provided under separate CETA 
youth programs. Although the report recognizes the broad 
definition of "training" that Baltimore uses—a definition 
that encompasses almost every activity allowable under 
CETA—the main emphasis is on occupational skill training; 
the important exceptions are noted. Finally, the report looks 
primarily at only the consortium-wide programs, excluding 
certain smaller programs run within individual counties.
The author is grateful for the cooperation given by the 
consortium managers and the various service delivery staffs; 
it was essential. He is especially indebted to Marion Pines, 
Director of the Mayor's Office of Manpower Resources, and 
her staff—Mark Horowitz, Joel Lee, and Marguerite Walsh 
in particular.
The Prime Sponsor Area
The Baltimore Metropolitan Area Manpower Consortium 
comprises Baltimore City and four surrounding counties: 
Anne Arundel, Carroll, Harford, and Howard. The prime 
sponsorship serves an area of about 1,646 square miles and a 





Anne Arundel County 361,200
Carroll County 92,500
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Harford County 146,200 
Howard County 116,600
An estimated 12 percent of the population was eligible to 
receive CETA services in fiscal 1979. Nearly 8 percent of the 
population was receiving AFDC, state or local public 
assistance, and approximately 13 percent of the population 
in the area was from families whose income was less than the 
OMB poverty guideline. A quarter of the total population 
was nonwhite, while slightly more than half of the city's 
population was nonwhite. No figures were available for the 
Hispanic population.
The Economy
The city of Baltimore and northern Anne Arundel County 
are heavily industrialized and Howard County is becoming 
increasingly developed with light industrial parks. Carroll, 
Harford and southern Anne Arundel Counties are still large 
ly rural and mostly bedroom communities. The overall 
character and well-being of the economy, however, is a func 
tion of Baltimore.
It has experienced a renaissance in the last decade, thanks 
to creative and energetic local leadership and a massive infu 
sion of federal money for mass transportation, urban 
renewal, community development and manpower develop 
ment. It is no boomtown by sunbelt standards but in com 
parison to other large northeastern industrial cities, its 
economy has been doing well. Unlike those other north 
eastern urban areas, Baltimore's growth over the last 30 
years has been steady and positive.
Baltimore's steady growth in labor market opportunities 
belies the dramatic shifts in the composition of the labor 
force, however. In the last thirty years, employment has 
shifted away from manufacturing towards more service and
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government dominated occupations. This trend, which mir 
rors national patterns, is expected to continue.
Political Governance
The relationships among the different political jurisdic 
tions comprising the Baltimore Metropolitan Area Man 
power Consortium are fairly typical of the kind of relation 
ships found in other CETA consortia. However, the institu 
tional setting of the city's manpower operations, which is in 
tegral to the nature of the consortium's managment, is 
atypical.
Baltimore City is the political hub of the manpower con 
sortium. While the resources available through CETA are 
important to Anne Arundel, Carroll, Harford, and Howard 
Counties, the programs are not as visible nor are they of as 
much strategic importance to the local political decision- 
makers. Representatives of the counties participate on the 
advisory council to the consortium and are especially active 
on the council's steering committee. But, by virtue of the 
agreement under which the consortium was established at the 
inception of CETA, the counties grant a great deal of 
authority to the Mayor's Office of Manpower Resources 
(MOMR) in the day-to-day operations and in longer term 
planning and direct contact with the Department of Labor. 
Each of the counties receives a share of services and in 
dividual allocations from the consortium's pot of money. 
But, whether it is because the counties want to avoid the 
potential embarrassment of running CETA programs, or 
because manpower development simply is not high on their 
local agendas, the counties' manpower administrators and 
executives are willing to stay out of the limelight.
The consortium balance of power that has been dictated 
by the formal agreement of delegation of authority has not 
been without costs. Baltimore County withdrew from the
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consortium at the end of fiscal 1979 after years of concern 
over equitable distribution of funds and disagreement over 
MOMR decisionmaking practices, strategies, policies, and 
programs. But so far, the other counties seem to be content 
with the status quo.
One question raised by the Baltimore Consortium's ex 
perience with the internal balance of political power is 
whether consortiums can work when more than one par 
ticipating jurisdiction has an aggressive CETA agenda. 
Although MOMR staff argue that the views and policies of 
all jurisdictions are accommodated, Baltimore County's 
withdrawal from the consortium at the end of fiscal year 
1979 indicates that there are limits to how well the consor 
tium can accommodate more than one jurisidiction with 
clear ideas on how to spend CETA dollars. If this is true of 
other consortia, it certainly raises questions about the merits 
of independent consortium management relative to those 
models dominated by a single jurisdiction, and tradeoffs be 
tween interjurisdictional peace and strong leadership.
CETA Funding
In 1979 only six other non-balance of state prime sponsors 
received CETA allocations exceeding the Baltimore Consor 
tium. The consortium received a total of $82,899,520 in new 
obligational authority under formula allocations and 
$1,112,918 in discretionary funds. The consortium has also 
received more than $42 million in obligational authority to 
operate a 21/2 year guaranteed job program for in-school 
youths and high school dropouts living in certain areas of the 
city. Baltimore also receives money from the governor's of 
fice for individual referrals to programs outside the usual 
training network (Table 1).
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Table 1 CETA Funding for Fiscal 1979, Baltimore Metropolitan Area 
Manpower Consortium
Source




























Governor's money 429,048 1,112,918
Skill training 
and improvement 
program (STIP) 3,558,219 0 1,156,279





a. $42,826,314 total obligational authority through September 30, 1980; $22,000,000 spent 
as of September 30, 1979.
Influences on CETA Operations
Two sets of variables affect training policies and practices 
in Baltimore: those external to MOMR and beyond its con 
trol—mostly relating to governance—and those internal to 
MOMR and within its control—those relating to planning, 
development, and implementation.
External Factors
Some of what is good about the Baltimore training opera 
tions could not be transplanted to other prime sponsors 
because it reflects a combination of governance ar 
rangements that are rare, if not unique to Baltimore. Prob 
ably the single most important factor is the consortium's
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locus of political power, which is based squarely in the city 
of Baltimore. MOMR, exercising administrative and 
representational powers liberally delegated by the four coun 
ties in the consortium, is most directly accountable to the 
mayor of the city of Baltimore, an activist committed to im 
proving the quality of life in Baltimore. This works to the ad 
vantage of MOMR because Baltimore has a "strong mayor" 
system of government granting the mayor authority over all 
city agencies, including the public schools. The mayor also 
virtually controls the "independent" city agency responsible 
for approving all contracts. The mayor is interested in the 
employment and training programs and is not about to let 
them be subordinated to narrow political interest, and sees 
more political mileage in well-run programs. While the 
governance arrangements in the Baltimore consortium work 
to MOMR's advantage, for sponsors where similar condi 
tions of political control and accountability could never be 
achieved, this fact may simply underline the influence of 
politics on the effectiveness of CETA. Moreover, this very 
strength in Baltimore could also be its Achilles heel. MOMR 
operates at the pleasure of the mayor and his goodwill 
undergirds MOMR's operations. But, just as MOMR has 
benefited from the good graces of what might be termed a 
benevolent despot, it could suffer badly at the hands of a less 
enlightened city leader. The enormous degree of flexibility 
which permits MOMR to capitalize on creative thinking and 
dynamic leadership could also lead to swift disintegration 
following a change in local political conditions.
The Baltimore area political environment's influence on 
MOMR also highlights the tradeoff between organizational 
fluidity that permits rapid adaptation for good or ill and in- 
stitutionalization that may rigidly preserve the good with the 
bad. MOMR's organizational fluidity has served it well dur 
ing its evolution. However, it is not so clear whether
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MOMR's ability to change will make it resistant to the 
vicissitudes of the Baltimore City political agenda.
Other aspects of the governance arrangements also affect 
the stability of the Baltimore Metropolitan Area Manpower 
Consortium, although the relationship is not so clear. The 
consortium, which was set up at the inception of CETA, 
depends heavily on the Mayor's Office of Manpower 
Resources having a dominant central role. On one hand, 
Baltimore City's interest in participating in the consortium 
seems to be premised largely on MOMR's having the 
authority generously given it under terms of the delegation 
of authority agreement signed by consortium members. On 
the other hand, it is not clear how viable MOMR would be 
were it not for the resource base available to it, thanks to the 
consortium. In other words, the critical mass of ad 
ministrative resources (staff, money, political discretion) 
have required a scale of operation that is feasible only with 
the involvement of other jurisdictions, which have been will 
ing to give up administrative resources and a degree of 
authority over how "their" share is spent, in return for the 
savings and convenience of having someone else do the lion's 
share of the work associated with running CETA programs. 
This raises another question about the value of the consor 
tium in Baltimore or any prime sponsor area, and the forces 
which hold it together.
Consortia have been encouraged by the Congress and the 
Department of Labor because it has been assumed that, 
though political jurisdictions are not necessarily conter 
minous with labor markets, federal labor market interven 
tions would be more effective if they were. Creation of con- 
sortia are encouraged as a way, therefore, of encouraging 
delivery of CETA services on a labor market-wide basis. 
Economic theory, however, has not provided the glue to 
keep corsortia together. Consortium bonuses and a readiness
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on the part of some jurisdictions to sacrifice some degree of 
control for the sake of administrative convenience are just 
two factors that appear to be instrumental in holding 
jurisdictions together. The implication is that if national 
policymakers consider changes in consortium incentives, 
they should not underestimate the importance of either of 
these factors, especially the latter, in contributing to consor 
tium stability.
The idea of the necessity of a "critical mass" of ad 
ministrative capacity makes it more desirable for federal 
policymakers to rethink the system of incentives for forming 
consortia. Amendments to CETA have consistently increas 
ed administrative burden without always increasing the 
resources to shoulder that burden. Since the scale of much of 
that burden has not been related to size (all sponsors must 
establish independent monitoring units and meet the same 
reporting requirements, for example), economies of scale are 
likely within consortia. Lacking a dramatic reduction in ad 
ministrative burden, federal policymakers might attempt to 
create more compelling incentives for jurisdictions to form 
consortia, or at least differentiate administrative burdens ac 
cording to prime sponsor size. This might include, for exam 
ple, scaled down or less frequent reporting requirements.
Internal Influences
Many other variables internal to MOMR and under some 
degree of MOMR control are more instructive about what 
makes for effective prime sponsor training policies and prac 
tices.
The MOMR Management Style. MOMR's style of control 
and policy is perhaps the most pervasive ingredient in 
MOMR's overall operations: there is a reason for practically 
everything that is done and the way it is done. The planning, 
contracting, and general management procedures and the
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organizational structure have evolved to serve particular pur 
poses. When changes are made, results are evaluated. If they 
are not what was expected and are not wanted, more changes 
follow. Where there are unanticipated spillovers, they are 
considered and the original decision may be reevaluated. 
What is important is that a deliberative process is followed 
before decisions are made; there are procedures for ex 
ecuting decisions and there is follow-up to assure implemen 
tation and assess consequences.
Management Amid Crisis. The difficulties that prime spon 
sors encounter in planning are practically germane to CETA. 
Uncertainties and delays associated with authorizing legisla 
tion, appropriations, and publication of regulations all 
create a climate in which it is defensible and occasionally 
prudent for local administrators to make no decisions or 
defer them until the latest possible moment. MOMR must 
live with the same vicissitudes, but managers cope better 
than most other prime sponsors by preparing contingency 
plans and hedging bets. It is a riskier style of operation than 
the wait-and-see approach found in more conservative spon- 
sorships, but it has the support of the mayor, no doubt part 
ly because it has not yet led to any major calamities.
Yet MOMR is the exception that proves the point that 
uncertainty in the CETA system must be reduced. MOMR is 
able to cope only because of somewhat extraordinary staff 
competence, a supportive political environment, and prob 
ably, luck. Taking away any ingredient leaves a situation in 
which CETA can become a political liability that is tolerated, 
and whose damage is minimized by keeping it at an arm's 
length from the political center of power. To the extent 
CETA is used as a countercyclical tool, life for prime spon 
sors is likely to be as uncertain as the economy. But stability 
is possible in other areas—as observers have stated 
repeatedly—through multi-year funding for the non-cyclical
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CETA activities and a greater sensitivity in Washington to 
the perils of playing "Crack the Whip" with changing 
regulations and budgetary brinkmanship.
The Importance of a Local Sense of Direction. Local control 
(and good management sense) is not enough, though. 
Another important factor in MOMR's training operations is 
substantive policy content. MOMR's sense of mission goes 
beyond either narrow political interests or compliance with 
the plethora of mandates from USDOL. Organizational 
goals and policies provide a frame of reference for inter 
preting mandates from both local and federal authorities. 
The Baltimore prime sponsorship does not have a reputation 
for being responsive to whims of the USDOL regional office 
because there are in-house agendas that also must be met. 
By the same token, the prime sponsorship has been able to 
withstand certain local pressures by countering them with 
well-articulated policies and procedures.
Not only are there reasons for resisting outside pressures, 
there are also means. MOMR is staffed and led in a way that 
encourages decision and policymaking on the basis of merit. 
Staff is enormously important in permitting this because it is 
well-qualified and experienced. Half the senior staff have 
worked together in the Mayor's Office of Manpower 
Resources since before enactment of CETA. Individually 
they almost all have firsthand experience in administration, 
planning, and direct client services. There is fairly good 
stability at lower staff levels as well. The reasons given for 
the stability are interrelated and might be both causes and ef 
fects of stability; they include good morale, competitive 
salaries, opportunities for career development, and a sense 
of professionalism.
These are not the kinds of ingredients that can be 
transplanted readily to other prime sponsors. But they are 
worth noting because they go hand-in-hand with the kind of
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institutional stability that is possible only over time and only 
in an accepting political climate. Federal mandates can help 
buy stability with stable funding. But to the extent the 
federal hand causes institutions to be out of step with local 
priorities, local political support is jeopardized, and with it, 
the opportunity for institutional continuity.
Aside from the style and philosophy of MOMR's manage 
ment, other factors especially important in affecting the 
prime sponsor's performance include: what training is of 
fered, who provides it, who receives it, and how those deci 
sions are made; curriculum; job placement; and relationship 
with the Department of Labor (Table 2).
Table 2 Enrollments for Fiscal 1979, Baltimore Metropolitan Area 
Manpower Consortium__________________________
Cumulative new Enrollees
enrollment carried over 
On board fiscal year from previous 
Source____Sept. 30,1979 1979______year

































a. As or September 30, 1979.
b. Includes enrollments since start of program in early 1978.
Training Decisions
MOMR's training decisions revolve around three ques 
tions: what training is to be provided, who is to provide it,
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and who is to be trained? At any one time MOMR offers 
training in roughly 25 occupational areas as well as in basic 
educational skills and job search/retention. The list of oc 
cupational areas has approximately doubled since the incep 
tion of CETA, partly in response to shifts in the occupa 
tional mix of the Baltimore labor force. The Skill Training 
and Improvement Program (STIP) and the private industry 
council (PIC) spending CETA Title VII money have been in 
strumental in permitting MOMR to extend the occupational 
skills repertoire into new and growing occupational areas by 
providing net new funds for training and increasing 
MOMR's contracting with for-profit training firms.
MOMR has expanded its training offering into higher 
technology occupational fields in response to changing labor 
market demand, a management philosophy that has en 
couraged flexibility, and federally imposed incentives which 
have encouraged training in occupational areas where 
placements are more likely. The continuing high placement 
rates experienced by MOMR trainees—usually exceeding 75 
percent—reflect the quality of training programs' curricula 
and placement efforts. But the direction of change is 
necessarily requiring more highly qualified trainees. It also 
seems likely to be pushing MOMR more directly into a posi 
tion of duplicating training offered by proprietary institu 
tions. The increasing presence of such institutions as training 
subcontractors to MOMR bears this out. One implication of 
this trend is that if MOMR is not providing services that are 
unavailable otherwise, it becomes more important that 
MOMR assure that the services go to clients who might 
otherwise not receive them.
Another lesson from MOMR's experience is the impor 
tance of new money in producing change. Even in a system 
as flexible and receptive to new ideas as MOMR, the expan 
sion of occupational offerings has been the product largely 
of new money. Net additional funds available under STIP,
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Titles VI, and VII, for example, have provided the resources 
which have permitted new kinds of training without cutting 
back training in more established areas.
What Training is Needed?
In deciding what training to provide, staff utilize the usual 
sources of labor market information such as the Employ 
ment Service and the Bureau of Labor Statistics to determine 
the occupational areas in which labor market demand 
justifies training. Another important source of intelligence 
on labor market conditions is the network of labor market 
advisory committees which represent, among others, 
employers, unions, and trainers. Those committees—one for 
each occupational area or clusterings of related occupational 
areas—advise on the nature of the market demand for new 
workers and the kind of training that is appropriate. Since 
the introduction of the Skill Training and Improvement Pro 
gram (STIP) and the increase in private sector involvement 
through Baltimore's private industry council, changes in 
MOMR's offerings of occupational training have needed to 
be more open-ended to branch out into new occupational 
areas. To meet this need, MOMR has turned to rely increas 
ingly on requests for proposals to stimulate new ideas from 
the training community, instead of approaching possible 
training contractors on the basis of a pre-established agenda.
Though federal pressures for greater use of requests for 
proposals were not a credible framework for justifying new 
policies (and different deliverers), it is not unlikely that the 
use of such open bidding processes can also ease the pressure 
for reconsidering established policies.
Who Should Train?
MOMR contracts with private nonprofit, private for- 
profit, and government agencies (including community col-
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leges) to provide training. There is no evidence of MOMR at 
taching a great deal of weight to the type of deliverer, perse, 
but because of certain other MOMR policies, the bias at the 
margin favors for-profit deliverers. In a machine skills pro 
gram, for example, MOMR made a point of contracting with 
a private firm because it is a major employer in the Baltimore 
area. More generally, though, the bias favors for-profit 
deliverers because they dominate the training field in the 
newer, "high-tech" occupational areas into which MOMR is 
trying to expand.
From year to year, the choice of service deliverers is 
premised on the assumption that unless evidence based on 
MOMR's performance indicates otherwise, trainers can be 
assured of continued business. The funding level is not 
guaranteed; but the assurance of continued funding at some 
level—contingent on satisfactory performance—helps build 
stability and continuity into the training infrastructure.
Who Should be Trained?
In certain respects the choice of who to train is given the 
most attention in MOMR. Enrollment in the occupational 
training program is selective; would-be trainees must meet 
entrance criteria for reading and math skills as well as some 
specialized criteria needed for particular training programs. 
MOMR takes pains to assure that the criteria are valid and 
relevant to the particular training regimen. But, in fact, be 
tween the criteria and the fact that trainers can screen out 
half of the qualified clients referred for training, the occupa 
tional skill training programs prove to be fairly selective in 
who they accept. Clients in the occupational skills training 
programs have higher levels of educational achievement 
from those in other activities and better work histories 
(measured in terms of length and wages of previous employ 
ment).
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There are three reasons for the selective enrollment 
policies that MOMR practices in its occupational skills train 
ing programs. First, MOMR managers will not in 
discriminately enroll anyone in skill training; would-be 
trainees cannot learn new skills if they are functionally il 
literate, for example. Second, MOMR is selective because it 
uses performance contracting for most of its occupational 
skills training. When contractors are paid on the basis of ab 
solute performance—placement of trainees in jobs—and not 
relative performance—gains in skill performance, for ex 
ample—they have a compelling interest in "creaming" refer 
rals to select the most qualified, motivated, and job-ready. 
The Department of Labor's emphasis on absolute outcome 
measures reinforces MOMR's performance standards. 
Third, MOMR's willingness to be selective about who gets 
into occupational skills training also stems from its efforts to 
please employers, because such training is geared more to 
meeting employer needs than to meeting clients needs.
MOMR compensates for selectivity in the occupational 
skills training programs by referring some clients with low 
skill levels to PSE jobs that can impart skills. The rationale is 
that the PSE jobs have training content which, though less 
structured, is better adapted to the needs and capabilities of 
clients functioning at low levels of educational achievement. 
Other clients with low levels of educational achievement or 
barriers to employment are referred to job search/retention 
and basic educational training. But the clients referred to 
training other than occupational skills training clearly are at 
a disadvantage. MOMR's own evaluations show that these 
clients do not fare as well as those going through the 
classroom training and on-the-job training. Moreover, 
MOMR has no systematic approach to channeling the lower 
achieving clients into occupational skill training, once they 
have had more basic assistance and are capable of learning 
more sophisticated job skills.
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Though plans call for providing a sequence of activities 
for more MOMR clients, certain factors work against it. 
Both work experience and public service employment are 
now integral components in MOMR's overall training offer 
ings because they are important developmental steps that 
provide progressively more structured training to clients 
needing the most help. Unfortunately, statutory restrictions 
on length of client enrollments in these activities prevent 
their use as one link in a long term training plan. Conse 
quently, MOMR can offer only a limited sequence and dura 
tion of developmental services; this might be satisfactory for 
clients close to being job-ready, but it is likely to be insuffi 
cient for clients with multiple barriers to employment. Fur 
thermore, the USDOL's use of per-enrollee and per- 
placement costs as the basis for evaluating costs favors 
minimization of those costs and hence discourages long term 
participation by the most disadvantaged clients.
MOMR's policies regarding what kinds of clients receive 
what kinds of services can be seen as a rejection of the 
popular assertion that CETA is for the worst-off. In fact, 
while MOMR's policies do not hew to the rhetoric associated 
with CETA, they are very responsive to the incentives and 
disincentives built into DOL's management of CETA. If the 
Congress and Department of Labor are serious about CETA 
serving clients with severe or multiple barriers to employ 
ment, both statutory and regulatory changes are needed to 
permit prime sponsors to choose between providing limited 
services to large numbers of eligibles, and providing more in 
tensive services to smaller numbers. At a minimum, limita 
tions on duration of participation must be relaxed when ser 
vices are provided as part of a planned developmental se 
quence. At the same time, the basis for evaluating prime 
sponsor costs should be changed from per-enrollee to a per- 
period of service basis. Client outcomes should also be 
evaluated in terms of relative gains and not absolute out 
come measures, as they presently are.
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'Twixt the Cup and the Lip: The 
Matter of Execution
Planning in MOMR is more effective and useful than 
usual because it is articulated with operations. The top 
managers' experience in both functions has prevented "plan 
ning" from becoming an isolated function; plans are turned 
into a contract package which becomes the basis for 
negotiating services and monitoring deliverers' performance. 
This arrangement has more firmly institutionalized 
MOMR's past planning efforts to unify planning and pro 
gram development in a way that forced program implica 
tions to flow from what otherwise could have been rather dry 
and abstract plans. Finally, MOMR's use of performance 
contracting creates a "market" for training program output; 
by making payment contingent on successful completion by 
trainees and placement in jobs, MOMR is able to reinforce 
the connection between planning and implementation.
It is hard to argue with the success of MOMR's planning 
and development practices. For that reason alone they 
deserve scrutiny. But they are also noteworthy because they 
are somewhat at odds with much of the conventional wisdom 
about what constitutes "good" CETA management.
First, MOMR's planning is mostly incremental, accepting 
previous policies and practices unless there are compelling 
reasons for changes. But the policy of minimal change does 
not reflect a lack of affirmative policymaking. Rather, it at 
tempts economy of motion in a state of local CETA practice 
in which fine-tuning rather than massive overhaul is more 
appropriate. MOMR top management deliberately avoids an 
annual top-to-bottom review of all aspects of operations 
because it is felt that labor markets, contractor capacity, and 
resource levels will not change dramatically from year to 
year.
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After the federal government's bad experiences with an 
nual top-to-bottom planning under zero based budgeting, 
public administrators have learned that incremental planning 
does have some virtue. For example, the 1978 CETA amend 
ments relaxed requirements that had required a complete an 
nual plan from prime sponsors; now a more limited annual 
plan is submitted to indicate significant operational objec 
tives and amend, if necessary, a more permanent master 
plan.
But MOMR's experience is not an unqualified endorse 
ment of incremental planning. Rather, it indicates that in 
cremental planning works when a sound, long term plan and 
underlying objectives are in place. A danger that both prime 
sponsors and DOL officials overseeing prime sponsors 
should be aware of is that incremental planning in a badly 
designed system can be nonproductive or counterproductive 
when it merely fine-tunes a dysfunctional system.
A second feature of planning in MOMR that is somewhat 
at odds with "good" CETA management is the lack of at 
tention given to developing the advisory capacity of its plan 
ning council. The formally mandated planning council is not 
ignored, but the staff do not see it as a valuable institutional 
asset, and members of the council do not see it as the best 
forum for influence. MOMR has chosen instead to rely 
primarily on its labor market advisory committees and its 
private industry council as sources of input from outsiders. 
MOMR's network of labor market advisory committees 
predates CETA, although the number of occupational areas 
on which committees advise has increased. The advisory 
committees have served a number of valuable purposes. 
They have served as a means for corroborating information 
on labor market demand collected from more traditional 
sources (the Employment Service and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, for example) and as a source of information on
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occupation-specific training and experience requirements for 
would-be workers. The committees also provide a forum for 
a number of community voices where they can advise on the 
issues in which they are well-versed. Finally, the committees 
provide a mechanism by which participants—private 
employers, in particular—can have a sense of ownership in 
MOMR's programs. Because of the success MOMR has had 
with its advisory committees, the Department of Labor's 
regional office has not been insistent about getting the plan 
ning council more actively involved. Although Baltimore's 
private industry council has not been in place for long, the 
PIC has effectively carved out an active advisory role for 
itself and is also assuming responsibility for private-public 
sector bridge activities.
Experience so far with the CETA advisory councils, 
documented elsewhere, clearly indicates that their role needs 
to be re-thought. Requirements for the councils were written 
into the law as a way of forcing state and local government 
officials to give voice to members of the community that 
might be ignored otherwise, and to create a channel for the 
flow of outside ideas for CETA officials to consider in plan 
ning and evaluating their operations. Yet analysts studying 
CETA have delivered a virtually unanimous verdict that the 
councils are ineffective relative to the time, effort, and 
resources invested in them.
MOMR's experience is instructive on two counts. First, it 
shows that in even a relatively well managed prime sponsor, 
an advisory council is of limited usefulness. Second, it shows 
that an outside advisory group representing a cross-section 
of interests can play a real and useful role in the context of a 
more structured decisionmaking environment.
The main lesson from Baltimore with respect to advisory 
councils is that, at the very least, Washington policymakers 
ought to permit a variety of advisory council models.
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Operational Components in MOMR
MOMR goes to great pains to assure that there is a full 
range of training services to meet the range of client needs. 
Yet, though MOMR managers argue that client needs can be 
met by the range of services offered, other factors build in 
biases that can work against easy client access to services. 
Almost all the occupational skills programs and virtually all 
the job search/retention and basic educational skills pro 
grams are run on fixed cycles with pre-established starting 
and completion dates. MOMR's fixed curriculum approach 
is not costless. Managers point out that individual assistance 
is possible, but self-paced learning in the occupational skills 
program is not feasible on a full-scale basis. The fixed cur 
riculum makes it all the more imperative that would-be 
trainees be screened to assure they have the requisite abilities 
to keep up with the training program. Furthermore, while 
fixed cycles and starting dates make it easier to manage the 
programs, it means that clients may have to be put "on 
hold" until a new training course starts. The fixed schedules 
also make scheduling participation in different programs 
more difficult. MOMR's job search/retention and basic 
educational skills programs are designed to accommodate 
more self-paced learning. They, too, have fixed starting 
dates and schedules for completion, but the curriculum is 
better adapted to meeting particular client needs and actual 
completion time varies from client to client.
To the extent MOMR and other prime sponsors may find 
themselves, in the future, under pressure to serve more 
severely disadvantaged clients, sponsors may find themselves 
trying to serve a less homogeneous clientele, making it less 
feasible to run fixed cycle training programs because the 
trainees will require a wider range of individualized attention 
and services. It is not possible to compare the merits of fixed 
cycle programs to open entry-open exit programs in
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Baltimore because the latter are used in only a few cases of 
employability skills training. To better evaluate this 
tradeoff, Washington policymakers ought to determine 
whether fixed cycle training is more effective than open 
entry-open exit; if it is, any mandate to serve a wider cross- 
section of client needs ought to take account of changes in 
the cost-effectiveness of training.
Placement is another important feature of MOMR's train 
ing programs. The occupational training programs (in 
cluding on-the-job training) have the highest placement rates 
of any of MOMR's employment and training activities, with 
about three-fourths of all trainees being placed. Placement 
rates for persons in less structured training activities, such as 
public service employment jobs, are lower, though still better 
than the national average. A large part of the success of the 
occupational training program can be attributed to the fact 
that placement is done using a "client-based" approach in 
which training program instructors and counselors—the peo 
ple who know the trainee capabilities best—contact 
employers and develop jobs. This approach capitalizes on 
the extensive contact many of the skill trainers have with the 
employer community. Until fiscal 1981, clients in the other 
training activities (including those transitioning out of PSE 
jobs) were placed in jobs by means of a centralized job 
development and placement office that scoured the employer 
community for vacancies and then referred clients against 
those vacancies. Because it put distance between the job 
development and placement functions, that style of place 
ment was not well-suited to "negotiating" with employers 
about bona fide job requirements, providing employers with 
an accurate profile of client skills and experience, or 
matching client and employer interests. Starting in fiscal 
1981, all job development will be modeled after the client 
based approach used in occupational skills training pro 
grams.
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MOMR's experience with job development offers impor 
tant lessons to those prime sponsors struggling with finding 
jobs for completing trainees. MOMR has tried both a 
"client-based" approach that more fully accounts for client 
needs first, and a job-based approach that focuses on job re 
quirements. It has found the former approach is more likely 
to keep both the trainees and employers hiring them happy. 
But MOMR has also capitalized on the access to the 
employer community that a broad spectrum of contract 
training institutions provides. This means that training 
deliverers should be judged not just on their training capaci 
ty but their likely access to the job market.
The Response to Changing 
Economic Conditions
According to conventional economic theory the best time 
to do occupational skill training is during economic lulls, 
because the economy does not have to sacrifice production in 
the short run for increased future productivity. But in the 
world of CETA, the dictates of economic theory are 
swamped by the intrusions of a less than perfect world and 
the sometimes heavy hand of the U.S. Department of Labor.
Theory fails partly because MOMR (and other CETA 
prime sponsors) is training clients who are not likely to be 
sacrificing productive time to engage in training; they ex 
perience unemployment and underemployment even in the 
best of times. The premium that USDOL puts on placing 
trainees in jobs penalizes skill training during economic 
downturns. The effect of this factor would be mitigated if 
USDOL did not try to compress training and placement into 
a short period of time (within a year). But the time horizons 
for CETA prime sponsors as well as trainees in need of 
employment are necessarily short. MOMR evidence cor 
roborates other evidence that trainees do not want to get in-
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volved in long term training programs because they need im 
mediate employment. MOMR avoids long contract cycles 
because of newly imposed limits on enrollment in work ex 
perience and public service employment—major components 
in many MOMR training programs. Because of the way the 
regional office enforces regulatory limits on carry-over from 
one fiscal year to another, MOMR is also limited in writing 
contracts that straddle fiscal years. Consequently, the 
natural preference is to steer training resources into short 
term training in occupational areas in which the current de 
mand for new workers is strong.
In the opinion of observers, diversification of the 
Baltimore economy makes it more resistant to cyclical swings 
than most cities. When there is a softening of demand in cer 
tain occupational areas, MOMR responds by cutting back on 
training capacity in the affected areas and may relax the job 
placement goals that training deliverers must meet in order 
to get paid. For example, MOMR cut back on welding train 
ing when Bethlehem Steel, the largest area employer, began 
laying off workers. More recently, some of the building 
trades projects have encountered great difficulty in placing 
trainees in jobs, and are pressing for lower placement stan 
dards.
It is hard to use the effects of the last recession as a basis 
for judging MOMR's training policies during recessions 
because the organization has changed so much since then 
and because of the enormous build-up in public service 
employment that was also going on at that time. It is argued 
that the 1976-1977 build-up of public service employment 
diverted energies in MOMR away from gearing up training 
programs in anticipation of the economic recovery, and 
towards the more pressing problems of developing public 
service jobs and placing clients in them.
171
Because the CETA countercyclical programs so far have 
been in the form of increased job creation, the question of 
how much training MOMR would undertake with non- 
categorized countercyclical funds is largely academic, 
leading to more speculation than solid policy proposals. The 
question of what to do with expanded training funds (with 
no option to fund public service employment) is less 
academic, and there is specific MOMR experience as a basis 
for speculation.
Net new training money has had two identifiable effects in 
the Baltimore Consortium: stimulating new programs and 
spurring institutional change. One important determinant of 
the effects new money has is the pace at which it must be 
spent. For sudden surges of new money—like that occurring 
under the 1977 Economic Stimulus Act—the imperative is to 
spend quickly, leaving little opportunity for development. 
MOMR managers feel that the best contingency plan for this 
kind of new money is to rely on the training infrastructure 
already in place. This includes expansion of existing pro 
grams and start-up of new programs already "on the shelf" 
with much of the developmental work already done. This 
kind of expansion occurred recently when one of MOMR's 
youth program allocations was increased and a limit was im 
posed on carry-out, thus forcing increases in spending rates. 
Under both the Skill Training and Improvement Program 
and the Private Sector Initiatives Program (Title VII), there 
was both more time and a mandate to broaden the local in 
frastructure. Under the former, institutional changes occur 
red in the form of new training contractors being added to 
the training infrastructure; in the latter, change occurred in 
the form of increased private sector participation in planning 
certain CETA activities.
MOMR managers would like to attempt expansion of 
upgrading and retraining. They feel that upgrading and 
retraining programs, where they work, can spur important
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structural changes within corporate job ladders. Yet, in 1980 
only 16 enrollees were served under Title IIC. Part of the 
reason for underutilization of Title IIC may be a slack 
economy. Retraining during a recession may be socially op 
timal, but it is not optimal at corporate-level profit centers. 
Underutilization of IIC probably also has much to do with 
the restrictive regulations governing it. MOMR managers 
feel that although Title IIC is intended to improve produc 
tivity through retraining and upgrading, the regulations 
thwart that purpose by restricting eligibility to clients in 
dead-end entry level jobs. Title IIC retraining is restricted to 
employees with bona fide layoff notices and little prospect 
for recall, circumstances in which employers are likely to 
have little interest in new skills. Furthermore, employers in 
terested in government subsidies for retraining activities can 
get 50 percent of a new employee's wages paid for under an 
OJT contract, while they can get only 40 percent paid under 
IIC. Finally, IIC enrollments might require different intake 
procedures. Although some counties in the Baltimore Con 
sortium rely on the employment service for intake, there is 
no systematized procedure in the counties, nor an intake 
system in the city, for identifying employees on layoff, or 
those in low level, dead-end jobs. These administrative im 
pediments could be eliminated by MOMR. But the other 
problems associated with IIC and its accompanying regula 
tions require action by the Congress and USDOL.
What Can Really Make CETA Work?
Without a doubt, the single most important force driving 
MOMR is the organization's own sense of purpose. MOMR 
is a local creature serving a local agenda. If it could not, the 
political base in the Baltimore mayor's office and the sur 
rounding counties would erode. But this has implications for 
the influence of the U.S. Department of Labor. The cases in 
which federal initiatives produced positive changes seem to
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have been accompanied by net increases in funding. Both the 
Skill Training and Improvement Program (STIP, Title III) 
and the Private Sector Initiatives Program (Title VII) helped 
broaden the MOMR training infrastructure and introduce 
training in different occupational areas. But regulatory 
changes without additional money have, not surprisingly, 
been accepted grudgingly. The requirement for the indepen 
dent monitoring unit, for example, while not far astray from 
certain MOMR interests in oversight, specified compliance 
in a way that produced some friction between MOMR and 
USDOL; that friction appears to have done nothing to im 
prove the effectiveness of the IMU. Similarly, the idea of in 
dividualized development plans was not alien to MOMR, but 
the regulatory requirements for such plans were not readily 
compatible with (nor an improvement on) MOMR's own ar 
rangements. Federal initiatives in this form are probably 
more objectionable simply because they limit MOMR's flex 
ibility, while initiatives like STIP or PSIP may come with 
their own rules, but because they represent additional 
resources, increase MOMR's flexibility.
If the experience in Baltimore is to be instructive about 
anything, it is on the way Washington should view the rela 
tionship between the national agenda and the multitude of 
local agendas present in any federal grants-in-aid program. 
To the extent "CETA works" in the Baltimore area, it is not 
because MOMR is a handmaiden to the Department of 
Labor. Rather, it is because MOMR has a local agenda that 
is being pursued in a way that is compatible with the Depart 
ment of Labor's own agenda.
Congruence between federal and local priorities is not 
necessary for CETA to be effective; compatibility is. The im 
plications of this can be enormous. It means that, in fine- 
tuning CETA, the federal focus should be on: 1) helping 
prime sponsors develop a local agenda, and 2) evaluating 
any federal changes with respect to whether they increase or
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decrease the ability of CETA to accommodate two sets of 
objectives. In the case of the first point, the Department of 
Labor and the Congress must be willing to move away from 
requiring plans that are uniform in format and respond only 
to the terms of the federal notions of what CETA should do. 
Prime sponsor plans should, for example, be able to 
legitimately incorporate institutional self preservation goals 
as well as service delivery arrangements that are mutually 
beneficial to both prime sponsors and other city government 
agencies. Plans and modifications could then be judged 
against the interaction of two sets of priorities, not just one 
set of federal priorities.
Obviously, this means that the Department of Labor needs 
to have the capacity to oversee individual prime sponsor 
operations carefully enough to evaluate individual prime 
sponsor plans in a way that accounts for the entire context of 
prime sponsor operations.
Unfortunately, the Department of Labor has been ill- 
prepared to do such a careful job. It has neither the needed 
number of staff nor depth of experience. Yet without that 
support only two courses of events seem possible.
In one course of events, the Department of Labor and the 
Congress could back off their agenda, letting prime sponsors 
do what they want with minimal regard for federal goals. In 
the other course of events, the federal establishment could 
steamroller over local priorities, squeezing them out as a 
consideration as the Department of Labor implements 
CETA. Under this approach, Washington would mandate 
cookie-cutter plans that would be the same for all prime 
sponsors.
The first case is tantamount to leaving money on the 
stump and running. The second case requires prime sponsors 
to serve as simple extension of the Department of Labor. 
Neither scenario is politically acceptable. But one or the
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other seems likely if there is not a federal commitment to 
make the CETA partnership the symbiotic relationship it 
was intended to be.
